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DOCUMENTATION

STATEMENT BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING CHARITABLE
CHOICE AND THE COMMUNITY SOLUTIONS ACTt
CARL

H. ESBECK*

INTRODUCTION 1

Charitable choice is already part of three federal social service programs. The provision first appeared in the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA),2 two years later it was incorporated into the Community Services Block Grant Act of 1998,' and last year it was
made part of the reauthorization of funding for the Substance
t By letter of May 22, 2001, the House Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, invited the views of the U.S. Department of
Justice concerning statutory and constitutional issues raised by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1994A (Charitable Choice Act of 2001) of The Community Solutions Act of
2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (2001). This document is the Department's
response to the Subcommittee's letter. The date of the appearance before the
Subcommittee was June 7, 2001.
* Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General.
1. By letter of May 22, 2001, the House Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, invited the views of the U.S. Department of
Justice concerning statutory and constitutional issues raised by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1994A (Charitable Choice Act of 2001) of The Community Solutions Act of
2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (2001). This document is the Department's
response to the Subcommittee's letter. The date of the appearance before the
Subcommittee was June 7, 2001.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. 1996). Charitable choice appeared as § 104 of
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161 (1996). Section 604a applies to two
federal revenue streams: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and Welfare
to Work monies. Welfare to Work funds were made subject to PRWORA in the
1997 Balanced Budget Act.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9920 (Supp. 1998). Charitable choice appeared as § 679 of
the Community Services Block Grant Act, which was Tide II of the Coats'
Human Services Reauthorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-285, 112 Stat.
2702, 2749 (1998).

568

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 16

Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). 4
Each of these programs has the overarching goal of helping
those in poverty or treating those suffering from chemical dependency, and the programs seek to achieve their purpose by providing resources in the most effective and efficient means available.
The object of charitable choice, then, is not to support or sponsor religion or the participating religious providers. Rather, the
goal is secular, namely, to secure assistance for the poor and individuals with needs, and to do so by leveling the playing field for
providers of these services who are faith-based.
Charitable choice is often portrayed as a source of new federal financial assistance made available to-indeed earmarked
for-religious charities. It is not. Rather, charitable choice is a
set of grant rules altering the terms by which federal funds are
disbursed under existing programs of aid. As such, charitable
choice interweaves three fundamental principles, and each principle receives prominence in the legislation.
First, charitable choice imposes on both government and
participating faith-based organizations (FBOs) the duty to not
abridge certain enumerated rights of the ultimate beneficiaries
of these welfare programs. The statute rightly protects these
individuals from religious discrimination by FBOs, as well as from
compulsion to engage in sectarian practices against their will.
Second, the statute imposes on government the duty to not
intrude into the institutional autonomy of faith-based providers.
Charitable choice extends a guarantee to each participating FBO
that, notwithstanding the receipt of federal grant monies, the
organization "shall retain its independence from Federal, State,
and local governments, including such organization's control
over the definition, development, practice, and expression of its
religious beliefs." 5 In addition to this broadly worded safeguard,
there are more focused prohibitions on specific types of governmental interference such as demands to strip religious symbols
4. 42 U.S.C. § 300x-65 (Supp. 2000). SAMHSA concerns expenditures
for substance abuse treatment and prevention under Titles V and XIX of the
Public Health Services Act. The charitable choice provision pertaining to
SAMHSA, signed by President Clinton on October 17, 2000, appeared as Title
XXXIII, § 3305 of the Children's Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114
Stat. 1212 (2000). SAMHSA substance abuse treatment and prevention
expenditures were again made subject to a charitable choice provision in the
Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, signed by President Clinton on
December 21, 2000. See 42 U.S.C. § 290kk (Supp. 2000). This Act was incorporated by reference in the Consolidated Appropriation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d)(1) (2001). The parallel subsection in H.R. 7 is 42
U.S.C. § 1994A(d)(1) (2001).
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from the walls of FBOs and directives to remake the governing
boards of these providers.6 A private right of action gives ready
means of 7enforcement to these protections of institutional
autonomy.
Third, the statute reinforces the government's duty to not
discriminate with respect to religion when determining the eligibility of private-sector providers to deliver social services.8 In the
past, an organization's "religiosity," obviously a matter of degree
not reducible to bright-lines, was said to disqualify providers
found to be "pervasively sectarian." That inquiry was always
fraught with difficulties. Now, rather than probing into whether
a service provider is thought to be "too religious" as opposed to
"secular enough," charitable choice focuses on the nature of the
desired services and the means by which they are to be provided.
Accordingly, the relevant question is no longer "Who are you?"
but "What can you do?" So long as a provider is prepared to
operate in line with all statutory and constitutional parameters,
then an organization's degree of "religiosity" is no longer
relevant.
Because they are a useful way of framing the most pertinent
statutory and constitutional questions, we expand on these three
principles below. Moreover, as will be discussed, the Department
of Justice recommends certain amendments to § 1994A of H.R.
7.
I.

THE RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARIES

In programs subject to charitable choice, when funding goes
direcdy to a social service provider the ultimate beneficiaries are
empowered with a choice.9 Beneficiaries who want to receive services from an FBO may do so, assuming, of course, that at least
one FBO has received funding."0 On the other hand, if a beneficiary has a religious objection to receiving services at an FBO,
6.

42 U.S.C. § 604a(d)(2). The parallel subsection in H.R. 7 is 42 U.S.C.

§ 1994A(d) (2).
7.

42 U.S.C. § 604a(i).

The parallel subsection in H.R. 7 is 42 U.S.C.

§ 1994A(l).
8.

42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) and (c). The parallel subsection in H.R. 7 is 42

U.S.C. § 1994A(c)(1).
9. Charitable choice contemplates both direct and indirect forms of aid.
42 U.S.C. § 604a(a) (1). This is most apparent in H.R. 7 by comparing the subparts of 42 U.S.C. § 1994A(g). If the means of funding is indirect, as with, for
example, federal child-care certificates, then choice is intrinsic to the beneficiary's selection of a child-care center at which to "spend" his or her certificate.
10. It may be that on some occasions no FBOs successfully compete for a
grant or cooperative agreement. This is to be expected. Charitable choice is
not a guarantee that resources will flow to FBOs. Rather, charitable choice
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then the government is required to provide an equivalent alternative. 1 ' This is the "choice" in charitable choice. Moreover,
some beneficiaries, for any number of reasons, will inevitably
think their needs are better met by an FBO. This possibility of
choosing to receive their services at an FBO is as important a
matter as is the right not to be assigned to a religious provider.
There is much concern voiced by civil libertarians about the latter choice, whereas the former is often overlooked. Supporters
of charitable choice regard both of these choices-to avoid an
FBO or to seek one out-as important.
If a beneficiary selects an FBO, the provider cannot discriminate against the beneficiary on account of religion or a religious
belief. 2 Moreover, the text's explicit protection of "a refusal to
actively participate in a religious practice" insures a beneficiary's
right to avoid any unwanted sectarian practices.1 3 Hence, participation, if any, is voluntary or noncompulsory. When direct funding is involved, one recent court decision suggested that this
"opt-out" right is required by the First Amendment.' 4 Beneficiaries are required to be informed of their rights.' 5
guarantees only that FBOs will not be discriminated against with respect to
religion.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(e) (1). The parallel subsection in H.R. 7 is 42 U.S.C.
§ 1994A(f) (1). The alternative may be another provider not objectionable to
the beneficiary, or the government may find it more cost efficient to purchase
the needed services on the open market.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(g) (FBOs may not discriminate against beneficiaries
"on the basis of religion [or] a religious belief."). The parallel subsection in
H.R. 7 is 42 U.S.C. § 1994A(g)(1).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(g) (FBOs may not discriminate or otherwise turn
away a beneficiary from the organization's program because the beneficiary
"refus[es] to actively participate in a religious practice."). Thus, a beneficiary
cannot be forced into participating in sectarian activity. For reasons not apparent, 42 U.S.C. § 1994A(g) (1) of H.R. 7 omits this right of beneficiaries to avoid
unwanted sectarian practices. As will be noted below, the Department ofJustice
recommends an amendment to correct this omission.
By virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j), any such sectarian practices must be privately funded in their entirety and, hence, conducted separate from the government-funded program. See infra Part III (discussing the need to separate
sectarian practices from the government-funded program).
14. See DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397 (2d Cir.
2001) (dictum expressing belief that it would be violative of the Establishment
Clause should beneficiaries of state-funded alcohol treatment program be compelled to attend Alcoholics Anonymous sessions, such sessions being deemed
religious indoctrination).
15. The "actual notice" requirement first appeared in the SAMHSA
reauthorization. See 42 U.S.C. § 300x-65(e) (2). The parallel subsection in H.R.
7 is 42 U.S.C. § 1994A(f) (2). Of course, nothing in prior versions of charitable
choice prevents the government/grantor from ensuring actual notice of rights
to beneficiaries. Moreover, while it may be prudent for the grantor to provide
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The Department of Justice recommends that § 1994A of
H.R. 7 be strengthened by amending subsection (i) along the
lines indicated in the note below.16 This proposal has a clearer
statement of the voluntariness requirement. The provision on
separating the government-funded program from sectarian practices is discussed in Part III, below. The suggested Certificate of
Compliance has the purpose of impressing upon both the government/grantor and the FBO the importance of both voluntariness and the need to separate sectarian practices.
II.

THE AUTONOMY OF FAITH-BASED PROVIDERS

Care must be taken that government funding not cause the
religious autonomy of FBOs to be undermined. Likewise, care
must be taken that the availability of government funding not
cause FBOs to fall under the sway of government or silence their
prophetic voice. Accordingly, charitable choice was drafted to
vigorously safeguard the "religious character" of FBOs, explicitly
reserving to these organizations "control over the definition,
development, practice, and expression" of religious belief.1 7
Additionally, congressional protection for the institutional autonomy of FBOs was secured so as to leave them free to succeed at
what they do well, namely reaching under-served communities.
Finally, protecting institutional autonomy was thought necessary
to draw reluctant FBOs into participating in government programs, something many FBOs are unlikely to do if they face invasive or compromising controls.
notice of rights whether required by the underlying legislation or not, the
absence of a requirement in older versions of the law hardly rises to the level of
a constitutional concern.
16. (i) LIMITATIONS ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES;
VOLUNTARINESS.-No funds provided through a grant or cooperative agreement contract to a religious organization to provide assistance under any program described in subsection (c) (4) shall be expended for sectarian worship,
instruction, worship, or proselytization. If the religious organization offers such
an activity, it shall be voluntary for the individuals receiving services and offered
separate from the program funded under this subpart. A certificate shall be
separately signed by religious such organizations, and filed with the government agency that disbursed the funds, certifying that gives assurance the organization is aware of and will comply with this subsection. Failure to comply with
the terms of the certification may, in addition to other sanctions as provided by
law, result in the withholding of the funds and the suspension or termination of
the agreement.
17. Religious organizations often serve a useful role as moral critics of
culture and, in particular, the actions of government. The mention of "control
over ...
expression" in 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d) (1), prohibits government from
using the threat of denial of a grant, or withholding monies due under an
existing grant, as a means of "chilling" the prophetic voice of the FBO.
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One of the most important guarantees of institutional
autonomy is an FBO's ability to select its own staff in a manner
that takes into account its faith. Many FBOs believe that they
cannot maintain their religious vision over a sustained time
period without the ability to replenish their staff with individuals
who share the tenets and doctrines of the association. The guarantee is central to each organization's freedom to define its own
mission according to the dictates of its faith. It was for this reason that Congress wrote an exemption from religious discrimination by religious employers into Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. And charitable choice specifically provides that FBOs
retain this limited exemption from federal employment nondiscrimination laws."8 While it is essential that FBOs be permitted
to make employment decisions based on religious considerations, FBOs must, along with secular providers, follow federal
18. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f). The parallel subsection in H.R. 7 is 42 U.S.C.
§ 1994A(e) (2). In order that these employment protections be more clear to
all concerned, while still achieving the intended purpose, the Department of
Justice recommends that the "Employment Practices" subsection to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1994A be amended as set out below:
(e) EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES.(1) IN GENERAL.-In order to aid in the preservation of its religious character and autonomy, a religious organization that provides
assistance under a program described in subsection (c) (4) may, notwithstanding any other provision of federal law pertaining to religious
discrimination in employment, require that its employees adhere to
the religious beliefs and practices of the organization take into
account the religion of the members of the organization when hiring,
promoting, transferring, or discharging an employee.
(2) TITLE VII.-The exemption of a religious organization provided under section 702(a), and the exemption of an educational
institution under section or 703(e) (2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. §§2000e-1 (a), 2000e-2(e) (2)), regarding employment
practices shall not be affected by the religious organization's or institution's provision of assistance under, or receipt of funds from, pursuant
to a program described in subsection (c) (4). Nothing in this section
alters the duty of a religious organization to otherwise comply with the
nondiscrimination provisions in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.).
This proposed amendment would ensure that FBOs may continue to staff on a
religious basis. However, in this proposal religious considerations may not
affect the terms of the compensation package. Hence, there is no intended
"religious override" of minimum wage laws, or matters like social security or
unemployment compensation. Additionally, under this proposal any employment nondiscrimination provisions embedded in the underlying federal program legislation cannot affect an FBO's right to staff on a religious basis.
Finally, the §§ 702(a), 703(e) (2) exceptions in Title VII, while not broadened
in any respect, are expressly preserved.
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civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination on the bases of race,
color, national origin, gender, age, and disability. 9
Opponents of charitable choice have charged that it permits
a form of "government-funded job discrimination." We do not
believe this is the case for the following reasons. First, there is a
certain illogic to the claim that charitable choice is "funding job
discrimination." The purpose of charitable choice, and the
underlying federal programs, is not the creation or funding of
jobs. Rather, the purpose is to fund social services. The FBO's
employment decisions are wholly private. Because the government is not involved with an FBO's internal staffing decisions,
there is no causal link between the government's singular and
very public act of funding and an FBO's numerous and very private acts related to its staffing. Importantly, these internal
employment decisions are manifestly not "state or governmental
action" for purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. z °
Hence, because the Constitution restrains only "governmental
action," these private acts of religious
staffing cannot be said to
21
run afoul of constitutional norms.
19. In addition to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see, e.g., Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (1994) (prohibiting
discrimination on the bases of race, color, and national origin); Title IX of the
Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994) (prohibiting
discrimination in educational programs and activities on the bases of sex and
visual impairment); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination against otherwise qualified disabled
individuals, including individuals with a contagious disease or an infection such
as HIV); The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (c) (1994)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age).
20. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (holding that pervasive regulation and the receipt of government funding at a private nursing home does
not, without more, constitute state action); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982) (holding that a private school heavily funded by the state is not thereby
a state actor); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (holding
that the enactment of a law whereby the state acquiesces in the private acts of a
commercial warehouse does not thereby convert the acts of the warehouse into
those of the state).
21. That an act of religious staffing is not attributable to the government
and thus not subject to Establishment Clause norms restraining actions by government has already been ruled on by the Supreme Court. See Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 337 (1987) ("A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows
churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose ....
[I]t must be fair
to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities
and influence."). Id. at 337 n.15 ("Undoubtedly, [the employee's] freedom of
choice in religious matters was impinged upon, but it was the Church ... and
not the Government, who put him to the choice of changing his religious practices or losing his job."). Id.
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Second, critics of charitable choice are wrong when they
claim to have detected a contradiction. Why, they ask, is it
important to staff on a religious basis when the FBOs cannot
engage in religious indoctrination within a government-funded
program? Since there can be no such indoctrination, they go on,
what possible difference could it make that employees share the
FBO's faith? There is no contradiction, however, once this line
of argumentation is seen as failing to account for the FBO's perspective. From the government's perspective, to feed the hungry
or house the destitute is secular work. But from the perspective
of the FBO, to operate a soup kitchen or open a shelter for the
homeless is an act of mercy and thus a spiritual service. In his
concurring opinion in Corporation of the PresidingBishop v. Amos,
Justice William Brennan, remembered as one of the Court's foremost civil libertarians, saw this immediately when he wrote that
what government characterizes as social services, religious organizations view as the fulfillment of religious duty, as service in
grateful response to unmerited favor, as good works that give definition and focus to the community of faithful, or as a visible witness and example to the larger society.2 2 All of which is to
observe that even when not engaged in "religious indoctrination"
such as proselytizing or worship, FBOs view what they are doing
as religiously motivated and thus may desire that such acts of
mercy and love be performed by those of like-minded creed.2"
Third, it is not always appreciated that private acts of religious staffing are not motivated by prejudice or malice. In no way
is religious staffing by FBOs comparable to the invidious stereotyping, even outright malice, widely associated with racial and
ethnic discrimination. Rather, the FBO is acting-and understandably so-in accord with the dictates of its sincerely held
religious convictions. Justice William Brennan, once again, was
quick to recognize the importance of such civil rights exemptions to the autonomy of faith-based organizations:
Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an
organization's religious mission, and that only those committed to that mission should conduct them, is thus a
22.

Id. at 342-44 (Brennan, J., concurring).
23. We acknowledge that many FBOs do not staff on a religious basis, nor
do they desire to do so. But many others do, and desire to continue doing so.
Further, many FBOs that staff on a religious basis do so with respect to some
jobs but not others. Finally, many FBOs do not staff on the basis of religion in
any affirmative sense, but they do require that employees not be in open defiance of the organization's creed. The employment practices of FBOs, as well as
their religious motives, are varied and complex, yet another reason for government to eschew attempts to regulate the subject matter.
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means by which a religious community defines itself. Solicitude for a church's ability to do so reflects the idea that
furtherance of the autonomy of religious organizations
24
often furthers individual religious freedom as well.
Which is to say, not all discrimination is malevolent. 25 A
religious organization favoring the employment of those of likeminded faith is comparable to an environmental organization
staffing only with employees devoted to preserving the environment, a feminist organization hiring only those devoted to the
cause of expanded opportunities for women, or a teacher's
union hiring only those opposed to school vouchers. To bar a
religious organization from hiring on a religious basis is to assail
the very animating cause for which the organization was formed
in the first place. If these FBOs cannot operate in accord with
their own sense of self-understanding and mission, then many
will decline to compete for charitable choice funding. If that
happens, the loss will be borne most acutely by the poor and
needy.
Fourth, in a very real sense Congress already made a decision to protect religious staffing by FBOs back in 1964, and then
to expand on its scope in 1972.26 Section 702(a) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196427 exempts religious organizations
from Title VII liability for employment decisions based on religion.2 8 Opponents claim that the § 702(a) exemption is waived
when an FBO becomes a federally funded provider of social services. The law is to the contrary. Waiver of rights is disfavored in
the law, and, as would be expected, the case law holds that the
24. Amos, 483 U.S. at 342-43 (Brennan,J., concurring).
25. Cf Nathan J. Diament, A SlanderAgainst Our Sacred Institutions, WASH.
PosT, May 28, 2001, at A23. ("Their assumption is that faith-based hiring by
institutions of faith is equal in nature to every other despicable act of discrimination in all other contexts. This is simply not true.").
26. The nature and history of this expansion in the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 is set forth in Amos, 483 U.S. at 332-33. A co-sponsor
of the 1972 expansion, Senator Sam Ervin, explained its purpose in terms of
reinforcing the separation of church and state. The aim, said Senator Ervin,
was to "take the political hands of Caesar off the institutions of God, where they

have no place to be." 118 Cong. Rec. 4503 (1972).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a) (1994). Religious educational institutions are
separately exempt under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2) (1994).
28. The Title VII religious exemption was upheld in Corporationof the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Amos held that the exemption was
not a religious preference violative of the Establishment Clause. Moreover, the
Establishment Clause permits Congress to enact exemptions from regulatory
burdens not compelled by the Free Exercise Clause, as well as regulatory
exemptions that accommodate only religious practices and organizations. Id. at
334, 338.
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§ 702(a) exemption is not forfeited when an FBO becomes a provider of publicly funded services." Indeed, charitable choice
expressly states that the § 702(a) exemption is preserved. 3 ° In
light of the fact that the statutory language makes clear to FBOs
that they will not be "impair [ed]" in their "religious character" if
they participate in charitable choice, it is wholly contradictory to
then suggest that FBOs have impliedly waived this valuable
autonomy right.
Charitable choice affirmatively enables and requires government to stop "picking and choosing" between groups on the basis
of religion. No longer can there be wholesale elimination of able
and willing providers found by regulators or civil magistrates to
be "too religious," a constitutionally intrusive and analytically
problematic determination.3 1 With charitable choice, religion is
29. See Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 625 (6th
Cir. 2000) (dismissing religious discrimination claim filed by employee against
religious organization because organization was exempt from Title VII and the
receipt of substantial government funding did not bring about a waiver of the
exemption); Siegel v. Truett-McConnell College, 13 F. Supp.2d 1335, 1343-45
(N.D. Ga. 1994), affd, 73 F.3d 1108 (11th Cir. 1995) (table) (dismissing religious discrimination claim filed by faculty member against religious college
because college was exempt from Title VII and the receipt of substantial government funding did not bring about a waiver of the exemption or violate the
Establishment Clause); Young v. Shawnee Mission Med. Center, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12248 (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 1988) (holding that religious hospital did not
lose Title VII exemption merely because it received federal Medicare payments); see Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991) (exemption to Title
VII for religious staffing by a religious organization is not waivable); Arriaga v.
Loma Linda Univ., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619 (1992) (religious exemption in state
employment nondiscrimination law was not lost merely because religious college received state funding); Saucier v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 954 P.2d 285
(Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (Salvation Army's religious exemption from state unemployment compensation tax does not violate Establishment Clause merely
because the job of a former employee in question, a drug abuse counselor, was
funded by federal and state grants.).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2001). The parallel subdivision in H.R. 7 is 42
U.S.C. § 1994A(e) (2).
31. In regard to the constitutional and practical difficulties with sorting
out, and then barring from program participation, those FBOs thought to fit
that slippery category of "pervasively sectarian," the plurality in Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793(2000), said as follows:
[T]he inquiry into the recipient's religious views required by a focus
on whether a school is pervasively sectarian is not only unnecessary but
also offensive. It is well established, in numerous other contexts, that
courts should refrain from trolling through a person's or institution's
religious beliefs ....
Although the dissent welcomes such probing...
we find it profoundly troubling.
Id. at 827 (citations omitted).
The problem is more thoroughly addressed in Carl H. Esbeck, Institute of
Bill of Rights Law Symposium: Religion in the Public Square: Religion and the First
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irrelevant during the grant awarding process. Nor does the government, in making awards, need to sort out those groups
thought "genuinely" religious from those deemed pseudo-religious. This means that, contrary to the critics' fears, charitable
choice leads to less, rather than more, regulation of religion.
Additionally, welfare beneficiaries have greater choice when
selecting their service provider. For those beneficiaries who, out
of spiritual interests or otherwise, believe they will be better
served by an FBO, such choices will now be available in greater
number. Expanding the variety of choices available to needy
individuals in turn reduces the government's influence over how
those individual choices are made.
III.

THE NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE

When discussing Establishment Clause restraints on a government's program of aid, a rule of equal-treatment or nondiscrimination among providers, be they secular or religious, is
termed "neutrality" or the "neutrality principle." Charitable
choice is consistent with neutrality, but courts need not wholly
embrace the neutrality principle to sustain the constitutionality
of charitable choice.
The U.S. Supreme Court distinguishes, as a threshold matter, between direct and indirect aid.3 2 For any given program,
charitable choice allows, at the government's option, for direct
or indirect forms of funding, or both. Indirect aid is where the
ultimate beneficiary is given a coupon, or other means of free
agency, such that he or she has the power to select from among
qualified providers at which the coupon may be "redeemed" and
the services rendered. In a series of cases, and in more recent
commentary contrasting indirect aid with direct-aid cases, the
Supreme Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of
mechanisms providing for indirect means of aid distributed without regard to religion.3 3
Amendment: Some Causes of Recent Confusion, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 907-14
(2001) (collecting cases suggesting that to require distinguishing between pervasively and non-pervasively sectarian organizations is inconsistent with the
Court's case law elsewhere holding that civil authorities should refrain from
probing the inner workings of religious organizations).
32. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840-43 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
33. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (providing special education services to Catholic high school student not prohibited by
Establishment Clause); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. For the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a state vocational rehabilitation grant to disabled
student that elected to use the grant to obtain training as a youth pastor); Muel-
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The Child Care and Development Block Grant Program of
1990,"4 for example, has been providing low income parents
indirect aid for child care via "certificates" redeemable at, inter
alia, churches and other FBOs. The act has never been so much
as even challenged in the courts as unconstitutional.
In the context of direct aid, the Supreme Court decision
that has most recently addressed the neutrality principle is Mitchell v. Helms. 5 The four-Justice plurality, written by Justice
Thomas, and joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, embraced, without reservation, the neutrality principle. In the sense of positive law, however, Justice O'Connor's
opinion concurring in the judgment is controlling in the lower
courts and on legislative bodies.3 6
Before proceeding in greater detail, the controlling principle coming from Mitchell v. Helms can be briefly stated: A government program of aid that directly assists the delivery of social services at a

faith-based provider, one selected by the government without regard to
religion, is constitutional,but real and meaningful controls must be built
into the program
so that the aid is not diverted and spent on religious
37
indoctrination.
Based on Justice O'Connor's opinion, when combined with
the fourJustices comprising the plurality, it can be said that: (1)
neutral, indirect aid to a religious organization does not violate
the Establishment Clause;3 8 and (2) neutral, direct aid to a religious organization does not, without more, violate the Establishment Clause. 39 Having indicated that program neutrality is an
ler v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a state income tax deduction for
parents paying school tuition at religious schools); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 878-79 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (distinguishing cases upholding indirect funding to individuals, admitted to be the
law of the Court, from direct funding to religious organizations).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858-9858q (1994).
35. 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion).
36. Id. at 836 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Her opinion was joined byJusrice Breyer. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining
when Supreme Court fails to issue a majority opinion, the opinion of the members who concurred in the judgment on narrowest grounds is controlling).
37. Mitchell does not speak-except in the most general way-to the
scope of the Establishment Clause when it comes to other issues such as religious exemptions in regulatory or tax laws, religious symbols on public property,
or religious expression by government officials. In that regard, Mitchell continues the splintering of legal doctrine leading to different Establishment Clause
tests for different contexts.
38. See id. at 841-43.
39. See id. at 838-39. Justice O'Connor explained that by "neutral" program of aid she meant "whether the aid program defines its recipients by reference to religion." Id. at 845. To be "neutral" in this sense, a grant program
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important but not sufficient factor in determining the constitutionality of direct aid, Justice O'Connor went on to say that: (a)
Meek v. Pittenger4 ° and Wolman v. Walter41 should be overruled;
(b) the Court should do away with all presumptions of unconstitutionality; (c) proof of actual diversion of government aid to
religious indoctrination would be violative of the Establishment
Clause; and (d) while adequate safeguards to prevent diversion
are called for, an intrusive and pervasive governmental monitoring of FBOs is not required.
The federal program in Mitchell entailed aid to K-12 schools,
public and private, secular and religious, allocated on a per-student basis. The same principles apply, presumably, to social service and health care programs, albeit, historically the Court has
scrutinized far more closely direct aid to K-12 schools compared
to social welfare and health care programs.4 2
In cases involving programs of direct aid to K-12 schools,
Justice O'Connor started by announcing that she will follow the
analysis first used in Agostini v. Felton.4" She began with the twoprong Lemon test as modified in Agostini: is there a secular purpose and is the primary effect to advance religion? Plaintiffs did
not contend that the program failed to have a secular purpose,
thus she moved on to the second part of the Lemon/Agostini
must be facially nondiscriminatory with respect to religion, and, where there is
discretion in awarding a grant, nondiscriminatory as applied.
40. See id. at 837, 849-55 (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)).
Meek v. Pittenger(plurality in part) had struck down loans to religious schools of
maps, photos, films, projectors, recorders, and lab equipment, as well as disallowed services for counseling, remedial and accelerated teaching, and psychological, speech, and hearing therapy.
41. 530 U.S. at 837, 849-56 (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977)). Wolman v. Walter (plurality in part) had struck down use of public
school personnel to provide guidance, remedial and therapeutic speech and
hearing services away from the religious school campus, disallowed the loan of
instructional materials to religious schools, and disallowed transportation for
field trips by religious school students.
42. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1989) (upholding, on its face,
religiously neutral funding of teenage sexuality counseling centers); Bradfield
v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (upholding use of federal funds for construction at a religious hospital). In sharp contrast, the Court has been "particularly
vigilant" in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in K-12
schools, where the government exerts "great authority and coercive power" over
students through mandatory attendance requirements. Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987).
43. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836, 844 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997)). Agostini v. Felton upheld a program whereby public school teachers go
into K-12 schools, including religious schools, to deliver remedial educational
services.
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test.4 4 Drawing on Agostini, Justice O'Connor noted that the primary-effect prong is guided by three criteria. The first two
inquiries are whether the government aid is actually diverted to
the indoctrination of religion and whether the program of aid is
neutral with respect to religion. The third criterion is whether
the program creates excessive administrative entanglement,4 5
now clearly downgraded to just one more factor to weigh under
the primary-effect prong.4 6
After outlining for the reader the Court's Lemon/Agostini
approach, Justice O'Connor then inquired into whether the aid
was actually diverted, in a manner attributable to the government, and whether program eligibility was religion neutral.
Because the federal K-12 educational program under review in
Mitchell was facially neutral, and administered evenhandedly, as
to religion,4 7 she spent most of her analysis on the remaining
factor, namely, diversion of grant assistance to religious indoctrination. Justice O'Connor noted that the educational aid in question was, by the terms of the statute, required to supplement
44. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 845. Plaintiffs were well counseled not to argue
that the program lacked a secular purpose. The secular-purpose prong of the
test is easily satisfied. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988)
("[A] court may invalidate a statute only if it is motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose .... ").
45. In Mitchell, plaintiffs did not contend that the program created excessive administrative entanglement. 530 U.S. at 845. Prior to Agostini, entanglement analysis was a separate, third prong to the Lemon test.
The Supreme Court has long since stopped using the "political divisiveness" inquiry as a separate aspect of entanglement analysis. See, e.g., Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988) (rejecting political divisiveness alone as
a basis for invalidating governmental aid program). Hence, neither the plurality nor Justice O'Connor gave even passing mention to "political divisiveness."
We follow their lead.
46. Alternatively, the same evidence shifted under the effect prong of
Lemon/Agostini can be examined pursuant to Justice O'Connor's no-endorsement test. Mitchel 530 U.S. at 845. The no-endorsement test asks whether an
'objective observer" would feel civic alienation upon examining the program of
aid and learning that some of the grants are awarded to FBOs. A finding of
government endorsement of religion is unlikely unless a facially neutral program, when applied, singles out religion for favoritism. In Mitchell, Justice
O'Connor did not utilize the alternative no-endorsement test when doing the
Lemon/Agostini analysis. We follow her lead. She did, however, use the noendorsement test for another purpose. See id. at 842-43 (explaining why she
thought the plurality was wrong to abandon the direct-aid/indirect-aid
distinction).
47. Religious neutrality, explained Justice O'Connor, ensures that an aid
program does not provide a financial incentive for the individuals intended to
ultimately benefit from the aid "to undertake religious indoctrination." Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 845-46 (quoting Agostini).
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rather than to supplant monies received from other sources,4 8
that the nature of the aid was such that it could not reach the
"coffers" of places for religious inculcation, and that the use of
the aid was statutorily restricted to "secular, neutral, and nonideological" purposes.4 9 Concerning the form of the assistance, she
noted that the aid consisted of educational materials and equipment rather than cash, and that the materials were on loan to the
religious schools.5 °
48. One of the aims of charitable choice is that faith-based and other
community organizations be able to expand their capacity to provide for the
social service needs of under-served neighborhoods. In that sense, then, charitable choice is supplemental. For many neutral programs of aid, application of
the supplement/not-supplant factor would, if allowed to be controlling, conflict
with long-settled precedent. For example, the Court has long since allowed
state-provided textbooks and bussing for religious schools. See Cochran v. La.
State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (textbooks); Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947) (bussing). Once the government provided textbooks and
bussing, monies in a school's budget could be shifted to other uses, including
to sectarian uses. Yet such aid is in apparent conflict with the admonition to
supplement/not-supplant. See also Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 661-62 (1980), where the Court upheld aid that "supplanted" expenses otherwise borne by religious schools for state-required testing. Even the dissent in Mitchell concedes that reconciliation between Regan
and an absolute prohibition on aid that supplants rather than supplements "is
not easily explained." 530 U.S. at 897 n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting). Regan suggests that no "blanket rule" exists. Id. at 815 n.7 (plurality opinion).
The Supreme Court's past practice is to trace the government funds to the
point of expenditure, rejecting any requirement whereby government funds
must not be provided where the public funds thereby "free up" private money
which then might be diverted to religious indoctrination. See Regan, 444 U.S. at
658 ("The Court 'has not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other
resources on religious ends.'") (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743
(1973)); NewYork v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 134 (1977) ("[T]his Court
has never held that freeing private funds for sectarian uses invalidates otherwise
secular aid to religious institutions .. .
49. See 530 U.S. at 847.
50. Id. at 848-49. On at least one occasion the Supreme Court upheld
direct cash payments to religious K-12 schools. See Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
The payments were in reimbursement for state-required testing. Rejecting a
rule that cash was never permitted, the Regan Court explained, "We decline to
embrace a formalistic dichotomy that bears so little relationship either to common sense or the realities of school finance. None of our cases requires us to
invalidate these reimbursements simply because they involve [direct] payments
in cash." Id. at 658. See also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 819 n.8 (plurality noting that
monetary assistance is not "per se bad," just a factor calling for more care).
Justice O'Connor explained that monetary aid is of concern because it
"falls precariously close to the original object of the Establishment Clause's prohibition." Mitchell 530 U.S. at 856. Part of that history, explicated in Everson v.
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), was the defeat spearheaded in Virginia by James
Madison of a proposed tax. As more precisely explained by Justice Thomas, the
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Justice O'Connor proceeded to reject a rule of unconstitutionality where the character of the aid is merely capable of diversion to religious indoctrination, hence overruling Meek and
Wolman.51 As the Court did in Agostini, Justice O'Connor
rejected employing presumptions of unconstitutionality and indicated that henceforth she will require proof that the government
aid was actually diverted to indoctrination. 2 Because the "pervasively sectarian" test is such a presumption, indeed, an irrebutable presumption (i.e., any direct aid to a highly religious
organization is deemed to advance sectarian objectives)," Justice
O'Connor is best understood to have rendered the "pervasively
sectarian" test no longer relevant when assessing neutral programs of aid. 4
Justice O'Connor requires that no government funds be
diverted to "religious indoctrination," thus religious organizations receiving direct funding will have to separate their social
service programs from their sectarian practices." If the federal
assistance is utilized for educational functions without attendant
legislation defeated in Virginia was a tax ear-marked for the support of clergy.
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 852 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Opposition to a tax ear-marked for explicitly religious purposes
indeed does go to the heart of the adoption of the Establishment Clause. Charitable choice monies, however, come from general tax revenues, and are
awarded in a manner that is neutral as to religion, and do not fund sectarian
practices.
51. 530 U.S. at 845-60.
52. Justice O'Connor's statement sidelining future reliance on presumptions that employees of highly religious organizations cannot or will not follow
legal restraints on the expenditure of government funds is as follows, "I believe
that our definitive rejection of [the] presumption [in Agostini] also stood foror at least strongly pointed to-the broader proposition that such presumptions of religious indoctrination are normally inappropriate when evaluating
neutral school-aid programs under the Establishment Clause." Id. at 857-58
(citing Agostini).
53. See id. at 845-47 (noting that Agostini rejected a presumption drawn
from Meek and later Aguilar); id. at 850-53 (quoting from Meek the "pervasively
sectarian" rationale and noting it created an irrebutable presumption which
Justice O'Connor later rejects); id. at 857-58 (requiring proof of actual diversion, thus rendering "pervasively sectarian" test irrelevant); id. at 860 (rejecting
presumption that teachers employed by religious schools cannot follow statutory requirement that aid be use only for secular purposes); and id. at 863-64
(rejecting presumption of bad faith on the part of religious school officials).
54. WhileJustice O'Connor did not join in the plurality's denunciation of
the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine as bigoted, her opinion made plain that the
doctrine has lost relevance. Thus, while not taking issue with the plurality's
condemnation of the doctrine as anti-Catholic, she in fact explicitly joined in
overruling the specific portions of Meek that set forth the operative core of the
"pervasively sectarian" concept. 530 U.S. at 850.
55. Id. at 860.
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sectarian activities, then there is no problem. If the aid flows into
the entirety of an educational program and some "religious
indoctrination [is] taking place therein," then the indoctrination
"would be directly attributable to the government." 56 Hence, if
any part of an FBO's activities involves "religious indoctrination,"
such activities must be set apart from the government-funded
program and, hence, are privately funded.
A welfare-to-work program operated by a church in Philadelphia illustrates how this can be done successfully. Teachers in
the program conduct readiness-to-work classes in the church
basement weekdays pursuant to a government grant. During a
free-time period the pastor of the church holds a voluntary Bible
study in her office up on the ground floor. The sectarian instruction is privately funded and separated in both time and location
from the welfare to work classes.
In the final part of her opinion, justice O'Connor explained
why safeguards in the federal educational program at issue in
Mitchell reassured her that the program, as applied, was not violative of the Establishment Clause. A neutral program of aid need
not be failsafe, nor does every program require pervasive monitoring. 57 The statute limited aid to "secular, neutral, and nonideological" assistance and expressly prohibited use of the aid for
"religious worship or instruction. '58 State educational authorities required religious schools to sign Assurances of Compliance
with the above-quoted spending prohibitions being express
terms in the grant agreement. 59 The state conducted monitoring visits, albeit infrequently, and did a random review of govern60
ment-purchased library books for their sectarian content.
There was also monitoring of religious schools by local public
school districts, including a review of project proposals submitted
by the religious schools and annual program-review visits to each
56.

Id.

A lower court recently applied this principle by striking down

direct monetary payments, unrestricted as to use, to reimburse schools, including religious schools, to reimburse them for the cost of Internet access. See Freedom From Religion Found. v. Bugher, 249 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2001). Once
received, the money went into general revenues and could later be used for
sectarian purposes. On the other hand, the lower trial court decision in the
same case upheld a parallel program whereby the state provided a below-cost
Internet link to schools, including religious schools. Hence, the aid could not
be diverted to sectarian use. 55 F. Supp.2d 962, 966 (W.D. Wis. 1999). While
on appeal, the plaintiffs' challenge to this parallel program was dropped when,
in the interim, Mitchell v. Helms was handed down.
57. 530 U.S. at 861.
58. Id.
59. Id at 861-62.
60. Idat 862.
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recipient school.6 1 The monitoring did catch instances of actual
diversion, albeit not a substantial number, and Justice O'Connor
was encouraged that when problems were detected they were
timely corrected.6 2
Justice O'Connor said that various diversion-prevention factors such as supplement/not-supplant, aid not reaching religious
coffers, and the aid being in-kind rather than monetary are not
talismanic. She made a point not to elevate them to the level of
constitutional requirements. 6' Rather, effectiveness of these
diversion-prevention factors, and other devices doing this preventative task, are to be sifted and weighed given the overall context of, and experience with, the government's program.6 4
Charitable choice is responsive to the Lemon/Agostini test
and Justice O'Connor's opinion in Mitchell v. Helms.
1. The legislation gives rise to neutral programs of aid and
expressly prohibits diversion of the aid to "sectarian worship,
instruction, or proselytization."6 5 Thus, sectarian aspects of an
FBO's activities would have to be segmented off and, if contintied, privately funded. An amendment recommended by the
Department of Justice is set out in the note below.6 6 Under this
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 862-63.
Id. at 866.
530 U.S. at 867 ("Regardless of whether these factors are constitu-

tional requirements . .

").

64. Monetary payments are just a factor to consider, not controlling. This
makes sense given Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Bowen v. Kendick,
wherein she joined in approving cash grants to religious organizations, even in
the particularly "sensitive" area of teenage sexual behavior, as long as there is
no actual "use of public funds to promote religious doctrines." Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 623 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also supra note
49.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j) (Supp. V 1999).
66. The Department of Justice recommends that H.R. 7 be clarified by
the following amendment:
LIMITATIONS ON USE OF FUNDS; VOLUNTARINESS FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES.-No funds provided through a grant or cooperative agreement contract to a religious organization to provide
assistance under any program described in subsection (c) (4) shall be
expended for sectarian worship, instruction, worship, or proselytization. If the religious organization offers such an activity, it shall be
voluntary for the individuals receiving services and offered separate
from the program funded under this subpart. A certificate shall be
separately signed by religious such organizations, and filed with the
government agency that disbursed the funds, certifying that gives
assurance the organization is aware of and will comply with this subsection. Failure to comply with the terms of the certification may, in
addition to other sanctions as provided by law, result in the withholding of the funds and the suspension or termination of the agreement.
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proposal, direct monetary funding is allowed where an FBO, by
structure and operation, will not permit diversion of government
funds to religious indoctrination.6" Some FBOs, of course, will
be unable or unwilling to separate their program in the required
fashion. Charitable choice is not for such providers. Those
FBOs who do not qualify for direct funding should be considered
candidates for indirect means of aid.
2. Participation by beneficiaries is voluntary or noncompulsory. A beneficiary assigned to an FBO has a right to demand an
alternative provider. Having elected to receive services at an
FBO, a beneficiary has the additional right to "refuse to participate in a religious practice."6 8
3. Government-source funds are kept in accounts separate
from an FBO's private-source funds, and the government may
audit, at any time, those accounts that receive government
funds.6 9 Thus, charitable choice does take special care, because
the aid is in the form of monetary grants, in two ways: separate
accounts for government funds are established, hence, preventing the diversion of "cash to church coffers;" ° and direct monetary grants are restricted to program services, and hence, must
not be diverted to sectarian practices.7 1
4. For larger grantees, the government requires regular
audits by a certified public accountant. The results are to be submitted to the government, along with a plan of correction if any
variances are uncovered.7 2
67. Justice O'Connor nowhere defined what she meant by "religious
indoctrination." However, elsewhere the Supreme Court has found that prayer,
devotional Bible reading, veneration of the Ten Commandments, classes in
confessional religion, and the biblical creation story taught as science are all
inherently religious. See Esbeck, supra note 31, at 915 (collecting cases).
68. See discussion supra Part I.
69. In the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
reauthorization the segregation of accounts is required. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300x65(g) (2) (West Supp. 2001). This improves accountability, especially in helping to avoid diversion to "religious coffers," with little loss of organizational
autonomy. The parallel subsection to this provision appears in H.R. 7, 107th
Cong. § 1994(h)(1) (2001).
70. See 42 U.S.C.A. 300x-65(g) (1) (2001).
71. See 42 U.S.C.A. 300x-65(i) (2001).
72. All federal programs involving financial assistance to nonprofit institutions require annual audits by a certified public accountant whenever the
institution receives more than $300,000 a year in total federal awards. Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management and
Budget, Circular A-133, Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit
Organizations, 7 C.F.R. § 3052.200 (2001). The independent audit is not just
over financial expenditures, but includes a review for program compliance.
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Nothing in charitable choice prevents officials from implementing reasonable and prudent procurement regulations, such
as requiring providers to sign a Certification of Compliance
promising attention to essential statutory duties.7" Additionally,
it is not uncommon for program policies to require of providers
periodic compliance self-audits. Any discrepancies uncovered in
a self-audit must be promptly reported to the government along
with a plan to timely correct any deficiencies."4 The Department
ofJustice believes it prudent to add these additional provisions to
§ 1994A of H.R. 7.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Charitable choice facially satisfies the constitutional parameters of the Lemon/Agostini test, including Justice O'Connor's
application of that test in Mitchell v. Helms. Adoption of the
Department of Justice's recommendations in notes 15, 17, 64,
and 71, above, will further clarify and strengthen § 1994A's provisions, as well as ease its scrutiny in the courts. Moreover, for
many cooperating FBOs, those willing to properly structure their
programs and be diligent with their operating practices, it
appears that charitable choice can be applied in accord with the
applicable statutory and constitutional parameters.

73.

See supra notes 16 and 66 for an example of a "Certification of Com-

pliance" requirement drafted into the charitable choice provision.

74.

A self-audit subpart for insertion into § 1994A(h)(3) of H.R. 7 at,

would read as follows:

An organization providing services under a program described in this
section shall conduct annually a self audit for compliance with its
duties under this section and submit a copy of the self audit to the
appropriate Federal, State, or local government agency, along with a
plan to timely correct variances, if any, identified in the self audit.

